Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

California Packing Corporation, a corporation v.
State Tax Commission : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alvin I. Smith; Grant A. Brown; Garfield O. Anderson; Attorneys for Defendant.
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, California Packing Corporation, a corporation v. State Tax Commission, No. 6049.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/31

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCIJ r·.ENT
KFU

UT/,H S pro:- ME COURT
BRIEF

45.9

~6cKET No. (p OJ..f']

P- ~- - - - - - - - . J
Ju t4t &uprtmt C!!nurt

nft4t
&tatt nf lltta!J
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

No. 6049

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
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ALVIN I. SMITH,
GRANT A. BROWN,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON,
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CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORArriON, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 6049

STATE rrAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

To The IIonorable Chief Justice and To The Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah:
Comes now the defendant in the above entitled cause
and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing upon
said cause of action for the reasons and upon the grounds
herein briefly set forth as follows:

I.
THAT the construction given of subhead (1s't) of
subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, might not accompli'sh the
result intended by the Court.
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II.
THAT there are seeming inconsistencies between the
construction and the application of the section.

III.
THAT as an alternative measure of the gross receipts from the business done in the state, the factor
adopted by the defendant should be the measure of the
gross receipts.
In support of these contentions defendant submits
the following points which are based entirely upon argument's not previously cited to this Court in 'this cause,
and respectfully prays this Honorable Court to grant a
rehearing to the defendant in the above entitled cause
of action.
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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON PETITION FOR
REHEARING

I.
The Construction Given of Subhead (1st) of Subdivision (e) of Subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Might Not Accomplish the Result Intended by the Court.
A study of the opinion of 'the majority of the Court
indicates that, in effect, a decision was rendered in favor
of the Tax Commission, your petitioner. The Court held,
however, that the Commission was in error in the method
used in determining the amount of net income to be attributable to business done in the state, but that it was
justified under the statute in arriving at the same result
by the statutory method; that the Commission should
not have departed from the statutory formula in the
present case, but if it had used subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of 8ection 80-13-21, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, as interpreted by the Court, such
would yield "in the main, results closely akin to those
which the Commi'ssion sought to accomplish by departing
from the statutory formula.''
It is your petitioner's position that the Commission
is unable to accomplish these results because the interpretation placed on the sales factor by the Court might
not alloca'te to business done within the state any gross receipts from the sales in question.
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The section as quoted from the Court's opinion with
'the bracketed interpolations is a follows:
"(1st) Sales [within the State] except those
negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation
by agents or agencie<s chiefly situated at, connected
with or sent out from premises owned or rented
by the corporation [within 'the State] for the
transaction of business outside of this State, and
sales [wherever made] otherwise determined by
the Tax Commission to be attributable to the business conducted on such premises [owned or rented
by the corporation within this State for the transaction of business outside of this State]."
If this section is applied in this form, the effect of

the decision is to order the Commission to aHocate to
S'ales in Utah most of the sales which the Commission
had included as the measure of gross receipts in the
original decision of the Commission. All sales of goods
which have been manufactured or stored in Utah prior
to their sale are to be included as sales in Utah, unless
they are within the exception.
We have arrived at this conclusion from the Court's
repudiation of the plaintiff's construction of the section
in the following words:
"This results in excepting from gross income
attributable to Utah all sales made in the State
from goods manufactured and/ or stored in the
State if the agent of the Company negotiating the
sales is sent into the 8Jtate to make them. It is
hard to conceive that the legislature in enacting a
franchise tax law on foreign corporations doing
business in this State would provide them such a
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simple way of avoiding the tax. Goods are manufactured in the State, stored here, sold here to
merchants or jobbers in the State, the money received therefor, but i's not included in the income
attributable to busine ss done within the State because 1the salesman of the Company comes in from
or is connected with an office outside of this
State. Such meaning renders senseless the concluding clause of the 'section reading: 'and sales
otherwise determined by the Tax Commission to
be attributable to the business conducted on such
premises.' (Italics added) • • •"
1

The Court has thus held that the plaintiff Company
has read the statute with the wrong transposition. The
Court has declared that the Company cannot avoid the
tax by considering the'se sales as not being attributable
to Utah business. It was held that if any transposition
should be made to give the section meaning, the words
"by the corporation" should be transposed so that a
new meaning is put on the statute.
'' ( 1st) Sales except those negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or
agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent
out from premises owned or rented by the corporation, for the transaction of business outside of
this state, and sale's otherwise determined by the
Tax Commission to be attributable to the business
conducted on such premises.''
1

Such meaning finally results in the holding that all
sales of goods which have been manufactured, or which
are stored within Utah, are to be included as sales made
in Utah, with the exception of certain sales. Our inter-
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pretation of this exception will be discussed under Point
II.
Your petitioner has taken the liberty of summarizing
what the Court has held, in denying the contention of the
Company, in order to raise the question whether, on the
authority of such holding the Commission would be
justified in determining that the Company's sales were
Utah sales. Can the Commission act on the premise that
if the sales were not within the exception as defined by
the Court, such sales are to be assigned to Utah as gross
receipts from business done in Utah. The Court has
not in so many words answered this question, although
it has inferred as much. The Court has implied that because this section brings into the state, as business done
in the s'tate, all sales, wherever made or consummated,
of Utah goods, it is unnecessary for the Commission to
use Subsection 8 except for isolated transactions which
might ostensibly come under the exception.
Your petitioner reluctantly admits that, in the absence of a specific ruling to this effect, there remains a
serious doubt that it should adopt such an implication
as settled law.
II.

There Are Seeming Inconsistencies between the
Construction and the Application of the Section.
All sales of products manufactured or stored in Utah
prior to sale are to be attributed to Utah, except those
''sales which may be handled from offices or premises
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within the state to a purchaser without the state for
shipment out of the state, as made by an agent of the
Company chiefly engaged in out-of-state sales and business.''
Any sale which does not come within this exception
is to be considered as a Utah sale. The Court seems
to limit the exception to only those sales made to an
out-of-state purchaser by an agent of a Utah sales office
which is operated for the transaction of out-of-state
business.
We respectfully submit that this interpretation of
subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, would be
clear were there not conflicting and ambiguous statements in the remainder of the opinion. Without some
amplification and clarification of these conflicting statements, it is impossible for the Commission to redetermine
the tax of this Company in conformity with the decision
of the Court.
As stated above, the Commission could act on the
premise that because the sales of the Company were not
within the exception as defined by the Court, such sales
are to be assigned to Utah as gross receipts from business done in Utah. The Court has, however, failed to decide, in so many words, whether these sales are within
the exception.
The construction of the section, as outlined in the
first paragraph after the quotation of the statute with
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its bracketed interpolations, might be analyzed by considering the separate sentences. The first pertinent sentence is:
"To secure this result, and to avoid objection
on constitutional grounds of double taxation, it
except'S from sales the income of which is used
in computing the tax those which may be handled
from offices or premise'S within the state to a purchaser without the state for shipment out of the
state, if made by an agent of the company chiefly
engaged in out-of-state sales and business."
This sentence would except sales which have been
handled from a sales office within the state; but in the
case at bar the sales office of the Company, from which
all sales were made, was in San Francisco, California.
This, then, does not answer your petitioner's question.
The second sentence reads:
"Sales otherwi'se made of goods within the
state for shipment out of the state are deemed to
be sales made and business done within ~the state,
and enter into the income from which the tax is
computed.''
This genei1al statement, which we believe is the
essence of the opinion, implies that the Court considers
any sale of goods located within the state at the tim~ of
the sale to be made in the state, irrespective of where
the contract is consummated, where the buyer is located,
or the location of the sales office.
In effect, and for all intents and purposes, your petioner arrived at the same conclusion in its decision,
entered as Item 21, Record of Proceedings. The Com-
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mission ordered that the proposed deficiency be redetermined in accordance with the following rules:

''It is our opinion that in determining the allocation factor of gross receipts from sales assignable to business of the petitioner done within this
state, there should be included only the sales price
of all goods which were actually located in Utah
at the time of sale, whether manufactured or
packed in Utah or outside Utah, and irrespective
of the destination of the shipments. This would
require a change of the proposed deficiency by
adjusting the factor of gross receipts from sales
assignable to Utah by subtracting from the amount
assigned to Utah the sales price of •all goods manufactured or packed in Utah and shipped and
stored outside Utah prior to sale, and by adding
to such figure the sales price of all goods manuf·actured or packed outside Utah and shipped into
and stored in Utah prior to its sale.''
Thus, we see that your petitioner has already rendered a decision which would include precisely the same
sales to make up a numerator of the gross receipts fraction which the Court has held should make up this numerator, but which the Court has held should be labeled
"sales in Utah" rather than "gross receipts from business done in Utah." If the Commission makes this change
in terminology, will it accomplish the result intended by
the Court~
The next two sentences of the paragraph under discussion are particularly confusing to your petitioner and,
we are certain, give the Company some justification for
contesting the •above interpretation of the decision.
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The third sen tense reads:
''This construction also puts in'to the income
of business done within the state the proceeds of
sales of goods manufactured or stored within the
state but sold for shipment out of the state, where
the sale is made through a broker or jobber within
the state rather than through an out-of-state agent
or employee of the company.''
If the last phrase of this sentence-" rather than
through an out-of-state agent or employee of the company"-had not been appended there would not have
been this confusion, for it gives rise to an implication
that if the sale is made through an out-of-state agent or
employee of the Company, such sale should not be included in the income of business done within the state.
This, of course, is inconsistent with the preceding sentences.
We submit that the Court should either limit the
above sentence or amplify it so that it will be consistent
with the remainder of the paragraph.
The last pertinent sentence is as follows:
"We repe·at, the exception goes only to sales
to an out-of-state party when the agent of the
company making the sale is chiefly connected with
out-of-state business and such others made from
premises maintained for out-of-state business as
the Tax Commission may determine to be atltributable to business done out of the state."
This sentence is even more confusing to your petitioner than the previous, because it is impossible to determine what is meant by the words "chiefly connected with
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out-of-state business." If these words are meant to
include a sales agent sent from a San Francisco office
to sell goods in eight intermountain states, Utah among
them, then the sales of such agent in the State of Utah
might come within the exception. Would it then mean
that the r:rax Commission could not allocate to the state,
as sales in the state, the sales made by such an agent to
all purchasers if the goods are located in Utah at the
time of the sale1 If such allocation cannot be made, then
the result which the Court has intended could not be accomplished by the use of the sales factor.
If, however, these words are modified so as to apply
only to offices maintained in the state for out-of-state
business, the apparent inconsistency would be settled
without further elucidation. Your petitioner contends
that the Commission cannot apply subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6, so long as this sentence is
in its present form.
We respectfully suggest that the Court might render
a valuable service in instructing your petitioner as to
the full meaning intended by the decision, so that the
Tax Commission may be governed accordingly in its
future procedure.

III.
As an Alternative Measure of the Gross Receipts
from the Business Done in the State, the Factor
Adopted by the Defendant Should Be the Measure of the Gross Receipts.
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The Court has ruled that the Commission has authority to depart from the statutory formula under certain
circumstances, but that it was not necessary to do so in
the case at bar, because the same result could have been
accomplished by using the sales factor in arriving at
gross receipts from business done by the Company in
Utah. In our original brief and in our argument there
has not been advanced the Commission's interpretation
of subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of
Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. This
was not an oversight, but a deliberate omission, because
we maintained, and still contend, that gross receipts
attributable to Utah business can be arrived at by a
different measure under the authority of subsection 8.
If the Court will elucidate its decision so that the Commission has no doubt in its mind but that it can include
the sales above discussed as Utah sales, the discussion
of the following point may be disregarded. If, however,
the Court, is unable to reconcile the facts of this case
with the seeming inconsistencies incident to its opinion,
we respectfully submit that the factor adopted by the
Commission as the measure of the gross receipts from
business done in Utah should be used as an alternative
basis.
The Court has not ruled whether the Tax Commission is justified in determining gross receipts from some
other factor than sales as defined by subhead (1st) of
subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Re-
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vised Statutes of Ut,ah, 1933. The Court has recognized
the fact that the Tax Commission has not attempted, in
allocating the income of the Company, to apply the sales
factor as set forth in the above mentioned subdivision,
but the Court has overlooked the fact that the Commission in place of the sales factor has used a different
factor to arrive at the gross receipts attributable to
business done in Utah.
The Commission has considered receipts from business done in the state as being synonymous with the
value of the product produced in the state, so far as
manufacturing companies are concerned. V1alue is ordinarily measured in dollars and cents, as evidenced by
the price received from 'the product when it is transferred
to another person. Because the product was not sold
in the state does not mean that the value of the product
produced in the state could not be found. If this Company's 'total production in every state were the same,
that is, if the goods produced in Utah were of the same
quality and specifications as the goods produced in all
other states, it would be simple to measure the gross
receipts from business done in this state in proportion
to 'the gross receipts from business done in all states.
Thus, if the Company's total operations produced 100,000
cans of, let us say, tomatoes, and of this total 20,000
cans were produced in Utah, it would be reasonable to
hold that one-fifth of the receipts were attributable to
Utah operations. This is not possible, however, due to
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the fact that the quality and specifications of goods produced in Utah vary from the goods produced by the
company's total opemtions. There must necessarily be
a better measuring rod than the number of units produced.
When a manufacturing company is under consideration, the only logical solution is to find the value in
money of the product resulting from Utah operations
in comparison to the value in money of the product of all
operations. As far as the Company at bar was concerned, the only means of calculating the value of the
product was to use the price of the product when it
was finally exchanged for money. It was only then that
the value was in any way reduced to dollars and cents.
If the Company, 'at the conclusion of the production operations and at the time the goods were ready for shipment
out of the state, had entered on its books the inventory
value of the goods, such factor could be taken as the
value of the goods produced in Utah or the gross receipts assignable to business done in Utah. But the
value of these goods was not reduced to dollars and cents
until they were sold, which sales were consummated out
of the state in most instances. Such was the theory
inclining the Commission to disregard the sales factor
and adopt a different factor to arrive at the numerator
and denominator making up gross receipts.
We submit that the Court could readily hold (since
the resul't of such a procedure is approximately the same
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as that of the Court's opinion) that this method should
be upheld in order to arrive at a fair and equitable
proportion of the gross receipts of the Company in the
case at bar. There then would be no need to clarify
the Court's opinion or to reconcile the seeming inconsistencies. The Court has inferred that the Commission
was justified in finding that the operations of the Company in the year 1935 resulted in gross receipts in Utah.
We have stated above that if the Company had
reduced 'the value of its Utah products before shipment
out of the state to an inventory value, the Commission
could have used such a value to arrive at the gross receipts. It was for this purpose that the Commission
on page 14 of the hearing asked if it were possible to
make a separate accounting of the Utah operations. The
answer was in the affirmative. Thereupon the Chairman
of the Commission asked that a return be filed on a
separate accounting basis. In reply to the stipulation and
understanding the Company was given an opportunity to
file on such separate accounting basis. Evidently its
counsel misinterpreted the Commission's reasons for
wanting such return on a separate accounting, attributing it to one reason- that of securing more tax for the
state. But the main reason why such a return was requested was to ascertain from the Company's own report
the receipts from business done in Utah. Item 17 of the
Record of Proceedings, which deals with reasons why the
Company did not furnish such a return, does not discuss
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whether the records reveal the receipts from business
done in the sta'te, but outlines the difficulty the auditors
experienced in prorating the overhead expenses, factors
which were not germane to the issue.
We submit that the Tax Commission was justified
in asking for such a return of information, and upon
the refusal of the Company to furnish the same, it was
justified in adopting what it deemed to be the next best
measure of arriving at the gross receipts.
Therefore, we respectfully suggest that as an alternative, should the Court's definition of sales in Utah be
held inapplicable, the Commission's decision on this
point be approved.

SUMMARY
Your petitioner has attempted herein to set forth its
interpretation of the opinion heretofore rendered. Although it is not our intent or desire to ask the Court
to reverse the result it has reached, we do petition the
Court to confirm the implications deduced therefrom
by your petitioner. In simple terms we are asking if the
sales of the plaintiff Company are sales made in Utah.
We :are inclined to believe that it was the Court's intent
to hold that such sales should not be excluded from the
measure of the tax. Wherein 'the opinion has failed to
accomplish this result and wherein there are seeming
inconsistencies has been discussed in some detail.
Your petitioner further contends that as an alternative procedure there be adopted as the rule the measure
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originally used by the Commission. We submit that such
a measure will reconcile and obviate all seeming inconsistencies, yet allocate to Utah the proportion of net income fairly and equitably attributable to this state.
Respectfully submitted,

ALVIN I. SMITH,
GRANT A. BROWN,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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CERTIFICATE
I, Alvin I. Sm1th, attorney for the above named defendant, do hereby certify that in my opinion there is
good reason to believe that the Judgment heretofore
entered in the above entitled cause is erroneous in the
respect set forth in the foregoing Petition for Rehearing
and that the above cause should therefore be reexamined.
ALVIN I. SMITH.

